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Gideon v. Wainwright Revisited: What Does The
Right To Counsel Guarantee Today??
I. Foreword
Michael B. Mushlint?
In Gideon u. Wainwright,' the Supreme Court unanimously
held that indigent state felony defendants are constitutionally
entitled to the appointment of trial counsel. The opinion
aroused wide support, and even enthusiasm, almost from the
moment it was announced in 1963.2Two and a half decades later
t This conference was sponsored by The Legal Aid Society on October 22, 1988 to
celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Gideon. The conference transcript has been
edited and expanded upon by many of the participants. The Pace Law Review would
like to thank Michael B. Mushlin and Susan B. Lindenauer (Counsel to Executive
Director, The Legal Aid Society) for their organizational and editorial assistance.
It Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1966; J.D.,
Northwestern University, 1970. I am grateful for the willingness of Professors Donald L.
Doernberg and Barbara Salken to review and comment on earlier drafts of this foreword.
(Professor Mushlin served as the Reporter for the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Program on
Gideon v. Wainwright.)
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See infra note 66.
2. The President of the American Bar Association hailed Gideon soon after it was
decided as one of the "great advances in the administration of criminal justice in our
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this support has not dimini~hed.~
Even former Attorney General
Edwin Meese I11 approves.' However, are the words of praise
only lip service to the noble idea of the right to counsel? Has
Gideon really made a difference? Has its promise of a fair shake
for poor criminal defendants been kept, or has Gideon meant
only that defendants are provided with the fleeting and pressured presence of an unprepared lawyer? Moreover, does
Gideon's extend beyond the initial criminal trial stage to other
important quasi-criminal and civil proceedings?
To commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Gideon, to
reflect upon its impact today, and to assess its broader meaning,
The Legal Aid Society of New York convened a meeting on October 22, 1988, at the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. A diverse collection of distinguished individuals addressed
the conference. The speakers included a leading author and
chronicler of G i d e ~ n ,j~dges,~practitioners,'
~
academic^,^ and
country." A. LEWIS,GIDEON'STRUMPET
206 (1964) (quoting Sylvester C. Smith, Jr.).
Newspapers joined in the applause. Anthony Lewis reports that the St. Petersburg
Times, for example, editorialized soon after Gideon that the opinion "clings to the ancient democratic tradition of protecting the individual against the tyranny of any governmental agency." Id. a t 206. Lewis also reported that The Washington Post compared
Clarence Gideon to the Old Testament Gideon who "was summoned by an angel" to lead
a fight for justice. Id. at 206-07.
3. Although Gideon is one of the important Warren Court era decisions, it has escaped the criticism that has accompanied some of that Court's criminal law decisions.
See, e.g., Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND.L. REV.1417 (1985); Grano, MirandaS
Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174
(1988); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN.L. REV.1027 (1974).
4. Lewis, A Muted Trumpet, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1988, a t A31, col. 1. Former Attorney General Meese stated that "representation by counsel in all criminal cases is essential to the fair and effective administration of justice." Another measure of the current popularity of Gideon is found in the comment by Abe Krash, one of the participants
in the petitioner's brief in Gideon's appeal to the Supreme Court, that "no responsible
voice today urges that Gideon should be reversed." See infra p. 382 (Krash).
5. Anthony Lewis is a New York Times correspondent and author of GIDEON'S
TRUMPET
(1964), the best-selling history of the case.
6. Jack Weinstein, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York; Judith Kaye, Associate Judge on the New York Court of Appeals;
and Michael Juviler, Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
7. Paula Deutsch, criminal defense trial attorney with The Legal Aid Society; Susan
Salomon, a Legal Aid Society appellate lawyer; Barbara Underwood, head of the Appeals
unit of the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office, and former Professor of Law a t Yale Law
School; and Ronald Tabak, an attorney with extensive experience litigatng death penalty
cases.
8. Burt Neuborne, a noted Constitutional Law scholar from New York University
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even players in the Gideon drama.O The Pace Law Review has
chosen to publish this edited version of the proceedings1° to provide an illuminating perspective on one of the most significant
Supreme Court decisions of our time.
The comments of the authors range widely. Yet, two overriding, and in a sense contradictory, themes dominate. One is
celebratory. It praises the vision Gideon offers to our adversarial
system of justice. The other is critical. It highlights the ways in
which the Gideon promise has been betrayed, not realized." In
this Foreword, I will preview some of the authors' reflections on
both these themes.
A. Gideon Celebrated
In Gideon the highest Court in the land "reach[ed] down"12
to hear the plea of a fifty-two year old drifter, an outcast from
society. The story of how lawyers and judges handled Clarence
Gideon7s handwritten misspelled appeal is worth remembering.
As Anthony Lewis states, the "care, the vision, the imagination"
of the attorneys appointed by the Supreme Court to represent
Gideon on his appeal makes one "proud of law and lawyers in
this ~ountry."'~The simple elegance of the majority opinion
written by Justice Black," is also impressive. In that opinion
Justice Black proclaimed the "obvious truth [that] any person
School of Law who served as moderator of the conference; Professor Yale Kamisar of
Michigan Law School, a renowned Criminal Procedure scholar who was a keynote
speaker at the conference; and Professor Charles Ogletree, recent addition to the fulltime Harvard Law School faculty, after having had an outstanding career as a criminal
defense practicioner and lecturer.
9. The participants in the Gideon saga were: Abe Krash, a partner in the law firm of
Arnold and Porter, who served as counsel with Abe Fortas on the Gideon appeal to the
Supreme Court; and Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General of the United States during
the Johnson Adminsitration.
10. The remarks of the speakers at the conference were transcribed and edited versions sent to the speakers for their review. Some of the speakers, including Professor
Kamisar and Ronald Tabak expanded on the address that they gave at the conference.
11. Professor Neuborne, in a working paper prepared for the conference speakers,
suggested these terms. See infra p. 341 (Neuborne).
12. See infra p. 345 (Kamisar).
18. A. LEWIS,supra note 2, at 36. For a fascinating description of the strategy decisions made by the drafters of the Supreme Court brief in Gideon, see infra pp. 380-81
(Krash).
14. Justice Black had expressed a similar view twenty years before in a dissenting
opinion in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474-77 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
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hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."16
One might justifiably wonder, as does Judge Judith Kaye, a
keynote speaker at the conference, why it took the Supreme
Court so long to discover such an obvious truth.16 Dramatic evidence of this truth is to be found in Gideon itself. The trial
court said that Clarence Gideon had done about as well representing himself as an attorney might have done." However,
Anthony Lewis' presentation at the conference describing the
making of a motion picture based on the case, disproves that
assertion. The movie portrayed Fred Turner, the local Florida
attorney who represented Gideon after his case was remanded
by the Supreme Court for a new trial. Lewis vividly describes
how Turner's deceptively simple questions, overlooked at the
first trial, won an acquittal for his client.18
Just as Turner made a difference to Clarence Gideon,
Gideon's "great civilizing statement"la that a lawyer is required
for the trial of a serious criminal case improved the quality of
criminal justice dispensed in this country.'O Gideon led directly
to the dramatic growth of Legal Aid, public defender, and assigned counsel programs." Today, lawyers for the poor are common fixtures in criminal courts throughout the land. Judges at
the conference reported that these lawyers usually provide quality representation to their clients." But the effort required is
staggering.
The conference proceedings shed some light on the struggle
defense lawyers endure to fulfill the mandate of Gideon. Paula
Deutsch gives a gripping example in her account of the experiences of one Legal Aid Society trial attorney. She describes how
the mire of staggering caseloads, sullen defendants, and hostile
judges make it almost impossible to represent clients effectively
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
See infra p. 422 (Kaye).
See A. LEWIS,GIDEON'S
TRUMPET
238 (1964).
See infra p. 385 (Lewis).
See infra p. 341 (Neuborne).
See infra p. 399 (Ogletree).
See generally R. HERMAN,
ASSOCIATION
COUNSEL
FOR THE POOR:CRIMINAL
DEFENSE IN URBAN
AMERICA
(1977); NATIONAL
LEGALAIDAND DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION,
LEGAL
AND OPERATE
A LEGALAID OFFICE
(1971).
AID HANDBOOK:
HOWTO ORGANIZE
22. See infra p. 401 (Weinstein); p. 403 (Juviler).
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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and humanely. Her account is a rare description of the day to
day professional life of Legal Aid attorneys. As much as is possible from the printed word, one begins to appreciate what it
takes these lawyers to, as Deutsch puts it, "go in there as their
~hampion."'~
Susan Salomon, a Legal Aid Society appellate lawyer, adds her first-hand account of the difficulties faced by criminal defender appellate attorneys. They, too, must cope with
huge caseloads and limited resources to adequately represent
their clients on appeal.
~ h e s epresentations, therefore, make an important contribution to the Gideon literature. Because of the skill and diligence of attorneys like Ms. Deutsch and Ms. Salomon, the "silent voices"24 of previously unrepresented criminal defendants,
most of whom are minority and all of whom are poor, are now
heard in the criminal courts. But for Gideon that could not have
happened.
A quarter of a century later, the "romance of Gideon remains undimini~hed"'~precisely because defense attorneys like
Deutsch and Salomon pull justice out of a system that shouldn't
have it.2s However, as both suggest, a remembrance of Gideon
cannot be an occasion for celebration alone. The conference proceedings reveal that Gideon's deeper vision of a system of justice
in which money does not matter is far from realized.
B. Gideon's Promise Betrayed
Twenty-five years after Gideon, adequate legal representation for poor defendants has not been obtained. For defendants
in capital cases, there is a crisis in representation; for civil defendants, Gideon has yet to mean that they have even the hope
that counsel will be available to them. For many of the nation's
poor, therefore, the stark reality is that the legal system functions "as if Gideon had never been decided."27
Gideon's promise has not yet been realized even in the
criminal trial process with which Gideon dealt directly. Counsel
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra p. 387 (Deutsch).
See infra p. 400 (Ogletree).
Lewis, supra note 70.
See infra p. 340 (Neuborne). (This does not appear as an actual quote.)
See infra p. 341 (Neuborne).
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are invariably assigned to these cases. Unfortunately, however,
not all defense counsel measure up to the standards of Paula
Deutsch and Susan Salomon. Barbara Underwood reveals that
in many criminal cases the assignment of a lawyer means only
that there is a "warm body" at counsel table.28 Underwood's
story of a defense counsel who failed to investigate points on
appeal even when prompted by the district attorney, illustrates
how far we have to go to realize the promise of Gideon for the
typical criminal defendant. Chief Judge Jack Weinstein's discussion adds another dimension to the problem: defense counsel
who serve only as technocrats, unconcerned with the human dimension of the legal problems that their clients present.29
Conference speakers offer a number of explanations for this
sorry state of affairs. Professor Charles Ogletree, for example,
points to public defender systems that provide little training for
attorneys and few resources to investigate and prepare cases.30
The current Supreme Court's treatment of the right to counsel
also has contributed to this problem according to Professor Yale
Kamisar, a keynote speaker at the conference. As early as 1932
the Court held that the right to appointed counsel means the
~ ~ However, the Court, in recent years,
right to " e f f e ~ t i v e "aid.
has drained almost all meaning from this term. Professor
~
this point.
Kamisar uses Strickland u. W a s h i n g t ~ nto~ illustrate
Strickland held that to prevail with an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, a defendant must establish not only that his
attorney's conduct was "outside the wide range of professionally
competent a s ~ i s t a n c e , "but
~ ~ also that the failure was the direct
cause of the c o n ~ i c t i o nAccording
.~~
to Professor Kamisar this is
28. See infra p. 396 (Underwood).
29. See infra p. 403. (Weinstein).
30. See infra p. 398-99 (Ogletree). For a further discussion o f how large caseloads
and inadequate funding o f agencies providing defense counsel t o the indigent have
eroded the right t o counsel see Klein, T h e Emperor Gideon Has N o Clothes: T h e E m p t y
Promise of the Consitutional Right to Effective Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
CONST.L. Q. 625
(1986).
31. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
32. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Professor Kamisar discusses this case in the specific context
o f death penalty litigation. While Strickland has had a peculiarly disastrous effect on
death penalty litigation, Professor Kamisar's criticisms are applicable t o other criminal
cases as well. See infra notes 171-211 and accompanying text.
33. 466 U.S. at 690.
34. Id. at 694.
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a "herculean task."36 The result of Strickland is that the Supreme Court, in fact, has isolated itself from effectively reviewing problems in implementing G i d e ~ n . ~ ~
Death penalty cases provide a second example of Gideon
betrayed. Ron Tabak, a well-known advocate for the condemned, recounts numerous shocking instances of the failure to
provide counsel in these cases. An attorney can literally make a
life or death difference in capital cases, but all too often, Tabak
explains, the lawyer assigned to the case is not up to the job."
Frequently, death penalty lawyers neglect to even present mitigating evidence a t the penalty phase of the proceedings. As Professor Kamisar says, "even in the most outrageous and gruesome
murder cases, juries have voted for life . . . when provided some
basis for mercy, such as the terrible circumstances affecting the
defendant's formative de~elopment."~'But because of numerous
failures of defense counsel to develop this aspect of their cases,
often only the prosecutor is heard by the jury that fixes the
penalty.3B
Tabak and Kamisar also decry the failure to assign counsel
in death penalty habeas corpus cases. It is there that constitutional errors can be detected, corrected, and unjust executions
prevented. Tabak states that from one-third to one-half of all
death penalty convictions are vulnerable to reversal or retrial as
a result of habeas corpus proceeding^.^^ At the time of the conference, the Fourth Circuit had offered some cause for optimism
by holding that death penalty inmates were entitled to counsel
in these proceedings as part of the constitutionally guaranteed
right of "access to the courts."41 However, that hope was dashed
35. See infra p. 367 (Kamisar).
36. See infra p. 370 (Kamisar).
37. See infra p. 408 (Tabak). Tabak, T h e Death of Fairness: T h e Arbitrary and
Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty i n the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV.L. & SOC.
CHANCE
797, 803-07 (1986).
38. See infra p. 362 (Kamisar).
39. See infra p. 362 (Kamisar). Professor Kamisar assigns as a major reason for this
default the "scandalously little capital defense lawyers are paid in some states." S e e
infra p. 365. Professor Kamisar reports that in some southern states lawyers earn less
than a $1,000 per case, making the actual rate o f compensation for t h e diligent attorney
less than the attorney could earn "pumping gas." See infra p. 365-66.
40. Tabak, supra note 37, at 829-34.
41. Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988), reu'd, 109 S . C t . 2763
(1989).
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when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case only one
week afterward^:^ and later reversed by a five to four vote.43
The failure to apply Gideon to serious civil proceedings is
the final area in which Gideon has not been realized. The Supreme Court has limited Gideon to criminal trials.44In place of
Gideon's firm requirement of an attorney in every case, for civil
and quasi-criminal cases the Court has resurrected the case by
case Betts u. Bradyq6approach, which requires the losing party
to demonstrate on the record that counsel would have made a
difference to the outcome of the case. Thus, in non-criminal
cases an indigent litigant will not be entitled to counsel unless
she can affirmatively demonstrate that an attorney would materially affect the outcome of the proceedings, no matter how
grevious the d e p r i v a t i ~ n Because
.~~
the right to counsel has not
been recognized outside the criminal trial process, in many
cases, such as eviction proceedings in which poor defendants
face the loss of life's very necessities, they must proceed without
the aid of c ~ u n s e l . 'The
~ resulting eviction of thousands of poor
unrepresented tenants, in Professor Kamisar's words, "is to put
42. Giarratano v. Murray, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988) (certiorari granted).
43. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989). Professor Kamisar foreshadowed
this development when he expressed the hope that the "[hligh Court not address this
issue for several more years, in the hope" that in the meantime other lower courts will
follow the lead of the Fourth Circuit. See infra p. 375.
44. The Court has refused claims that the right to assigned counsel attaches automatically to probation revocation proceedings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791
(1973). Some states, however, have enacted statutes,insuring their citizens the right to
counsel in probation revocation proceedings. See, e.g., Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181
(10th Cir. 1985); State v. Coltrane, 307 N.C. 511, 299 S.E.2d 199 (1983). The Court has
also refused claims that the right to assigned counsel attaches automatically to stateinitiated proceedings to terminate parental rights. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981).
45. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Gideon the Court had rejected this 1942 ruling. Gideon
v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
46. This is true even if the civil proceeding threatens deprivation of constitutionally-protected rights, such as parental rights. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 27 (1981). Professor Kamisar criticizes this doctrine in practice because it leads
to the absurdity of needing a lawyer to demonstrate that the defendant needs a lawyer.
Nevertheless, the Court's opinions in these cases read "as if the Betts v. Brady approach
had never been discredited." See infra p. 354 (Kamisar).
47. See infra p. 352-53 (Kamisar). For a description of the harsh consequences of
the deprivation of counsel to poor tenants, see Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to
Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23
HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV.557 (1988).
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it mildly, anomalous - and, to put it strongly, s c a n d a l ~ u s . " ~ ~
While Professor Kamisar is not optimistic that the Court
will soon change direction,4ethe conference proceedings do contain the seeds of hope. Judge Kaye in her remarks reminds us
that "[sltate courts throughout the country [have] recently . . .
been more aggressive participants in the process of defining and
protecting individual rights,"60 by "increasingly . . . turning to
their own state constitutions as the dispositive ground for their
decisions . . . . It may well be that through such interpretations the true meaning of Gideon finally will be realized.62
C. Gideon Rediscovered

Gideon is measured as much in intangibles as in the precise
contours of its holding. Perhaps the most lasting significance of
Gideon is that it "inspire[d] the most profound dialogue about
the fundamental nature of this nation's pledge of justice for
That question is as important and as unresolved today as
it was when Gideon was decided a quarter of a century ago.
On one side Gideon offers the sterile right to appointed
counsel that is satisfied by the simple assignment of an overworked, undertrained young attorney without the 'ability or resources to make a major difference in the proceeding. But the
conference proceedings offer a different and much more expansive vision of Gideon. That vision is "about obtaining access for
everybody . . . [to] justiceMs4by ensuring that all persons are
given fair treatment in the courts regardless of their financial
status.
If this broader vision of Gideon more closely conforms to
our aspirations, then the work started in Gideon is far from
over.
48. See infra p. 353 (Kamisar).
49. Indeed, Professor Kamisar predicts that "it may take another forty years before
we see the emergence of a federal constitutional right to appointed counsel in eviction
proceedings." See infra p. 353 (Kamisar).
50. See infra p. 424 (Kaye).
51. See infra p. 425 (Kaye).
52. For example, litigation to provide the right to counsel in eviction proceedings is
pending in New York state courts. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
53. See infra p. 419 (Kaye).
54. See infra p. 415 (Katzenbach).

Heinonline - - 10 Pace L. Rev. 3 3 5 1990

336

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:327

The increasing sophistication of the law and the increasing
breakdown of society into "haves and a permanent underclass of
have not^"^^ makes the need for access to lawyers more critical
than ever. But, as the conference reveals, the need is not even
close to being met, and in many ways is even less well served
now than in the past. For example, legal services programs, that
at the time of Gideon were flourishing, are now under unrelenting pressure from Washington . . . [and] are grossly
inadeq~ate."~~
As Judge Kaye states:
We may still refer to the noble idea that every defendant stands
equal before the law, but in fact we have reconciled ourselves to
standing short of achieving it. Ironically, with society and the law
moving briskly toward a new century there may well be even
greater imbalances and distances between individuals like Clarence Gideon and acquittals after trial with effective counsel a t defendant's side. The law grows increasingly sophisticated as public
dedication to the principle of equal justice seems to dwindle.57

What can be done to stop this "terrible descent from shining ideals into tarnished reality?"58 The conference suggested
one answer: for Gideon to be truly realized, this generation's
lawyers must devote the same devotion and energy to the task as
the generation of lawyers that led the Court to the holding in
G i d e ~ n As
. ~ a~ young lawyer Abe Krash threw himself into the
task of writing the Gideon Supreme Court brief. At the conference he looked back a t that time as one of the proudest moments of his life.60If that spirit survives, there is reason to hope
with Yale Kamisar that Gideon's trumpet will sound again.61

55. See infra p. 403 (Weinstein).
56. See infra p. 403 (Weinstein). A recent report o f a committee o f lawyers commissioned b y New York Court o f Appeals Chief Judge Sol Wachtler t o study the advisability
o f requiring mandatory pro bono representation of indigents details the present crisis o f
unmet civil legal needs. Following an exhaustive review, the Committee came t o the conclusion that "the poor need legal help t o obtain basic human requirements and t o an
appalling degree cannot get it." Committee t o Improve the Availability o f Legal Services,
Preliminary Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 15 (June 30, 1989).
57. See infra p. 425 (Kaye).
58. See infra p. 403 (Weinstein).
59. See infra p. 379 (Krash).
60. See infra p. 383 (Krash).
61. See infra p. 378 (Kamisar).
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